Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte (redeeming himself somewhat for his inexplicable absence from either battle on the 14th) mauls Eugene Frederick Henry, Duke of Württemberg's previously untouched Reserve corps at the Battle of Halle on October 17 and chases it across the Elbe River.

Murat advances to Nemenčinė on July 1 running into elements of Doctorov's III Russian Cavalry Corps en route to Djunaszev.

Napoleon assumes this is Bagration's 2nd Army and rushes out before being told it is not twenty-four hours later.

Napoleon now attempts to use Davout, Jerome and Eugene out on his right in a hammer and anvil to catch Bagration to destroy the 2nd army in an operation spanning Ashmyany and Minsk.

This operation had failed to produce results on his left before with Macdonald and Oudinot.

Doctorov has moved from Djunaszev to Svir narrowly evading French forces, with eleven regiments and a battery of twelve guns heading to join Bagration when moving too late to stay with Doctorov.

Conflicting orders and lack of information had almost placed Bagration in a bind marching into Davout; however, Jerome cannot not arrive in time over the same mud tracks, supply problems, and weather, that has so badly affected the rest of the Grande Armée, losing nine thousand men in four days.

Command disputes between Jerome and General Vandamme will not help the situation.

Bagration joins with Doctorov and has forty-five thousand men at Novi-Sverzen by the seventh.

Davout had lost ten thousand men marching to Minsk and will not attack Bagration without Jerome joining him.

Two French Cavalry defeats by Platov keep the French in the dark and Bagration is no better informed with both overestimating the other's strength, Davout thinks Bagration has some sixty thousand men and Bagration thinks Davout has seventy thousand.

Bagration is getting orders from both Alexander's staff and Barclay (which Barclay doesn't know) and leaves Bagration without a clear picture of what is expected of him and the general situation.

This stream of confused orders to Bagration has him upset with Barclay, which will have repercussions later.

Napoleon had reached Vilnius on June 28, leaving ten thousand dead horses in his wake.

These horses were vital to bringing up further supplies to an army in desperate need.

Napoleon had supposed that Alexander would sue for peace at this point and is to be disappointed, and not for the last time.

Barclay has continued to retreat to the Drissa, having deciding that the concentration of the 1st and 2nd armies is his first priority.

Barclay continues his retreat and, with the exception of the occasional rearguard clash, remains unhindered in his movements ever further east.

To date the standard methods of the Grande Armée are working against it.

Rapid forced marches quickly cause desertion, starvation, expose  the troops to filthy water and disease, while the logistics trains loses horses by the thousands, further exacerbating the problems.

Some fifty thousand stragglers and deserters become a lawless mob warring with local peasantry in all-out guerrilla war, which further hinders supplies reaching the Grand Armée, now already down ninety-five thousand men.

Barclay has refused to fight despite Bagration's urgings.

Several times he had attempted to establish a strong defensive position, but each time the French advance had been too quick for him to finish preparations and he had been forced to retreat once more.

When the French army progresses further, serious problems in foraging surface, aggravated by scorched earth tactics of the Russian army advocated by Karl Ludwig von Phull.

Political pressure on Barclay to give battle and the general's continuing reluctance to do so (viewed as intransigence by the Russian nobility) leads to his removal.

He is replaced in his position as commander-in-chief by the popular veteran Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov.

Kutuzov, however, continues much along the line of the general Russian strategy, fighting the occasional defensive engagement but being careful not to risk the army in an open battle.

Instead the Russian army falls back ever deeper into Russia's interior.

Following a defeat at Smolensk on August 16–18 he continues the move east.

General Kutuzov, unwilling to give up Moscow without a fight, takes up a defensive position some seventy-five miles before Moscow near the village of Borodino, west of the town of Mozhaysk.

The French Grande Armée under Emperor Napoleon I attacks the Imperial Russian Army under Kutuzov and eventually captures the main positions on the battlefield but fails to destroy the Russian army.

About a third of Napoleon's soldiers are killed or wounded; Russian losses, while heavier, can be replaced due to Russia's large population, as Napoleon's campaign takes place on Russian soil.

The battle ends with the Russian Army, while out of position, still offering resistance.

The state of exhaustion of the French forces and the lack of recognition of the state of the Russian Army leads Napoleon to remain on the battlefield with his army instead of the forced pursuit that had marked other campaigns he had conducted.

The entirety of the Guard is still available to Napoleon and in refusing to use it he loses this singular chance to destroy the Russian army.

The battle at Borodino is a pivotal point in the campaign, as it is the last offensive action fought by Napoleon in Russia.

By withdrawing, the Russian army preserves its combat strength, eventually allowing it to force Napoleon out of the country.

The Battle of Borodino on September 7 is the bloodiest day of battle in the Napoleonic Wars.

The Russian army can only muster half of its strength on September 8.

Kutuzov chooses to act in accordance with his scorched earth tactics and retreat, leaving the road to Moscow open.

Kutuzov also orders the evacuation of the city.

By this point, the Russians have managed to draft large numbers of reinforcements into the army, bringing total Russian land forces to their peak strength in 1812 of nine hundred and four thousand with perhaps one hundred thousand in the vicinity of Moscow—the remnants of Kutuzov's army from Borodino partially reinforced.

Both armies have begun to move and rebuild.

The Russian retreat is significant for two reasons; firstly, the move is to the south and not the east; secondly, the Russians immediately begin operations that will continue to deplete the French forces.

Platov, commanding the rear guard on September 8, had offered such strong resistance that Napoleon had remained on the Borodino field.

On the following day, Miloradovitch assumes command of the rear guard, adding his forces to the formation.

Another battle is given, throwing back French forces at Semolino and causing losses of two thousand on both sides; however, some 10,000 wounded will be left behind by the Russian Army.

The French Army had begun to move out on September 10 with the still ill Napoleon not leaving until the 12th.

Some eighteen thousand men have been ordered in from Smolensk, and Marshal Victor's corps supplies another twenty-five thousand.

Miloradovich will not give up his rear guard duties until September 14, allowing Moscow to be evacuated.

Miloradovich finally retreats under a flag of truce.