Burgoyne, seeking to command a major force, proposes to isolate New England by an invasion from Quebec into New York.

This had already been attempted by General Carleton in 1776, although he had stopped short of a full-scale invasion due to the lateness of the season.

Carleton had been heavily criticized in London for not taking advantage of the American retreat from Quebec, and he is also intensely disliked by Germain.

This, combined with rival Henry Clinton's failed attempt to capture Charleston, South Carolina, places Burgoyne in a good position to get command of the 1777 northern campaign.

Burgoyne had presented a written plan to Lord Germain on February 28, 1777; Germain has approved it and has given Burgoyne command of the main expedition.

Burgoyne's invasion plan from Quebec has two components: he will lead the main force of about eight thousand men south from Montreal along Lake Champlain and the Hudson River Valley while a second column of about two thousand men (which Barry St. Leger is chosen to lead), will move from Lake Ontario east down the Mohawk River valley in a strategic diversion.

Both expeditions will converge upon Albany, where they will link up with troops from Howe's army marching up the Hudson.

Control of the Lake Champlain-Lake George-Hudson River route from Canada to New York City will cut off New England from the rest of the American colonies.

The last part of Burgoyne's proposal, the advance by Howe up the Hudson from New York City, proves to be the most controversial part of the campaign.

Germain had approved Burgoyne's plan after having received Howe's letter detailing his proposed offensive against Philadelphia.

Whether Germain told Burgoyne, who was still in London at the time, about Howe's revised plans is unclear: while some sources claim he did, others state that Burgoyne was not notified of the changes until the campaign was well underway.

Historian Robert Ketchum believes that Burgoyne would probably have been aware of the problems that lay ahead had he been notified of the Philadelphia plan.

Whether Germain, Howe, and Burgoyne have the same expectations about the degree to which Howe is supposed to support the invasion from Quebec is also unclear.

What is clear is that Germain has either left his generals with too much latitude, or without a clearly defined overall strategy.

In March 1777 Germain approves of Howe's Philadelphia expedition and does not include any express orders for Howe to go to Albany.

Yet Germain also sends Howe a copy of his instructions to Carleton, which plainly state that the northern army is to make a junction with Howe's army at Albany.