Mithridates takes refuge with Aulus Gabinius, the Roman proconsul of Syria.

Aristobulus, following an unsuccessful attempt to regain power in 56, is sent to Rome as a prisoner, there to remain until his death in 49.

Hyrcanus II meanwhile continues to be manipulated by those who wish to use him.

Gabinius deprives him of his office.

Clodius, while curule aedile in 56 BCE, impeaches Milo for public violence (de vi) while defending his house against the attacks of Clodius' gang, and also charges him with keeping armed bands in his service.

Judicial proceedings are hindered by violent outbreaks, and the matter is finally dropped.

The laws proposed by the triumvirs are duly passed by the Senate.

Cicero has tried to reintegrate himself into politics, but his attack on a bill of Caesar's proves unsuccessful.

The conference at Luca forces Cicero to make a recantation and pledge his support to the triumvirate.

With this, a cowed Cicero retreats to his literary works.

The bonds between the triumvirs are fraying by 56 BCE.

Pompey had soon become restive toward his alarmingly successful ally Caesar, as ha Crassus toward his old enemy Pompey, from 58 BCE to 56 BCE having supported efforts to neutralize Pompey's power.

In April, Caesar, no longer the amenable silent partner of the trio, calls first Crassus, then Pompey, to a secret meeting in the northern Italian town of Luca (Lucca) in Etruria, just inside Caesar's province of Cisalpine Gaul, to rethink their joint strategy.

They agree that Pompey and Crassus will again stand for the consulship in 55 BCE.

Once elected, they will extend Caesar's command in Gaul by five years.

At the end of their joint consular year, Crassus will have the influential and lucrative governorship of Syria, and use this as a base to conquer Parthia.

Pompey will keep Hispania in absentia.

The Veneti of Armorica and Their Conflict with Julius Caesar (57–56 BCE)

The Veneti, a powerful Gaulish maritime tribe, inhabited southern Armorica (modern Brittany, France), along the Morbihan Bay. Despite sharing a name with the Adriatic Veneti, they were linguistically and culturally distinct.

Geography and Fortifications

• The Veneti built their strongholds on coastal eminences, which became islands at high tide and peninsulas at low tide, making them natural defensive positions.
• Their most important settlement, likely their capital, was Darioritum (modern Vannes, called Gwened in Breton), which is mentioned in Ptolemy’s Geography.

Veneti Shipbuilding and Naval Superiority

The Veneti were master shipbuilders and sailors, their vessels well-adapted to the harsh Atlantic conditions:

• Ships built of oak, making them sturdy and durable.
• Large transoms fastened with iron nails as thick as a thumb for added reinforcement.
• Leather sails, which made their ships resistant to strong winds and turbulent seas.
• These features gave the Veneti a significant advantage over the lighter, Mediterranean-style Roman ships, especially in open-sea engagements.

Submission to Caesar (57 BCE) and the Breaking of the Treaty

• In 57 BCE, the Veneti and other Atlantic Gauls were forced to submit to Julius Caesar, then governor of Transalpine Gaul.
• They were compelled to sign treaties and hand over hostages as proof of their loyalty to Rome.
• However, by 56 BCE, the Veneti rebelled, capturing some of Caesar’s officers who were foraging in their territory.
• Their intent was to exchange the captured Romans for the hostages taken by Caesar.

Caesar’s Response and the Prelude to War

• Caesar viewed this as a breach of Roman law and an act of defiance.
• Furious at the Veneti's attempt at negotiation through force, Caesar prepared for war, setting the stage for the Veneti’s decisive naval battle against Rome in 56 BCE.

The Veneti’s mastery of the sea made them one of the most formidable challengers to Roman authority in Gaul, leading to a naval campaign that would test Rome’s adaptability and military strategy on the Atlantic coast.

The Roman-Veneti War and the Naval Battle of Quiberon Bay (56 BCE)

The Veneti rebellion in 56 BCE posed a major challenge to Julius Caesar’s forces, as their strongholds were heavily fortified by geography and their naval superiority in the Atlantic made them difficult to subdue. The Romans, unaccustomed to open-sea warfare, struggled against the Veneti’s tactical advantage but ultimately prevailed through perseverance and ingenuity.

The Geographic and Naval Advantages of the Veneti

• Veneti strongholds were built on natural defensive positions, becoming islands at high tide and peninsulas at low tide, making land-based sieges nearly impossible.
• Roman naval forces attempting amphibious assaults risked being trapped on the rocks when the tide ebbed, further complicating operations.
• The Veneti's superior ships were:
  • Larger and stronger than Roman galleys, built of thick oak planks resistant to ramming.
  • Taller, allowing them to rain down projectiles on attacking Roman vessels.
  • Highly maneuverable under sail, making boarding impossible for the Romans.
  • Crewed by expert sailors, with intimate knowledge of tides and coastal waters, further frustrating Roman tactics.

Caesar’s Engineering and Tactical Adaptation

• Recognizing that sieging individual strongholds was ineffective, Caesar ordered the construction of moles and siegeworks to serve as permanent bases of operations.
• However, whenever one stronghold was threatened, the Veneti would simply evacuate by sea and relocate to another, forcing the Romans to repeat their efforts.
• Realizing that eliminating the enemy fleet was the only way to win decisively, Caesar ordered his men to construct a fleet to challenge the Veneti at sea.
• However, direct combat proved futile, as:
  • Ramming was ineffective due to the thick hulls of Veneti ships.
  • Boarding attempts failed, as the Veneti’s superior ship height allowed them to repel attackers easily.

The Battle of Quiberon Bay: Roman Innovation Secures Victory

• Caesar’s legate Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus took command of the Roman fleet in a decisive naval battle off Quiberon Bay.
• Roman sailors used long billhooks to slash at the halyards of the enemy ships as they sailed past.
• Since the Veneti’s leather mainsails were fastened outboard, cutting the halyards caused the sails to collapse onto the deck, rendering the ships completely immobile.
• Now helpless, the Veneti ships were easily boarded, and the entire fleet fell into Roman hands.

The Fall of the Veneti and Roman Retribution

• With their naval supremacy lost, the coastal strongholds of the Veneti were stormed by Roman legions.
• Caesar executed or enslaved the entire population, demonstrating Rome’s ruthless response to rebellion.
• This brutal punishment served as a warning to other Gallic tribes, reinforcing Roman dominance in Gaul.

Significance of the Roman Victory

• The Veneti campaign was one of Rome’s first major naval engagements in the Atlantic, showcasing Roman adaptability in foreign warfare.
• The defeat of the Veneti eliminated a major obstacle to Roman control over western Gaul, allowing Caesar to turn his attention to other rebellious tribes.
• The harsh punishment inflicted on the Veneti set a precedent for Rome’s handling of future insurrections, ensuring that other Gallic tribes would think twice before resisting Roman rule.

The Battle of Quiberon Bay remains a testament to Roman persistence and tactical ingenuity, proving that even in unfamiliar waters, Rome could adapt and overcome seemingly superior enemies.

Mithridates III invades the Parthian kingdom from Syria, but after reigning briefly in 55 BCE is besieged by Surena, general of Orodes II, in Seleucia on the Tigris.

Surena is instrumental in the reinstatement of Orodes upon the Arsacid throne.

Ptolemy XII has prosecuted his restitution from Rome but has met opposition with certain members of the Senate.

His old ally Pompey had housed the exiled king and his daughter and argued on behalf of Ptolemy's restoration in the Senate.

During this time, Roman creditors realize that they will not get the return on their loans to the Egyptian king without his restoration.

Pressure in 57 BCE from the Roman public had thus forced the Senate's decision to restore Ptolemy.

Rome does not wish to invade Egypt to restore the king, however, as the Sibylline books state that if an Egyptian king asks for help and Rome proceeds with military intervention, great dangers and difficulties will occur.

Egyptians have heard rumors of Rome's possible intervention and dislike the idea of their exiled king's return.

Cassius Dio reports that a group of one hundred men were sent as envoys from Egypt to make their case to the Romans against Ptolemy XII's restoration, but Ptolemy had their leader (a philosopher named Dion) poisoned and most of the other protesters killed before they reached Rome to plead their desires.

Ptolemy XII finally recovers his throne in 55 BCE by paying Aulus Gabinius ten thousand talents to invade Egypt.

Gabinius's army, sent by Pompey without the consent of the Senate, after defeating the frontier forces of the Egyptian kingdom, proceeds to attack the palace guards but the guards surrenders before a battle commences.

The exact date of Ptolemy XII's restoration is unknown; the earliest possible date of restoration is January 4, 55 BCE and the latest possible date is June 24 the same year.

Ptolemy, upon entering the palace, has his daughter Berenice and her supporters executed.

Around two thousand Roman soldiers and mercenaries, the so-called Gabiniani, are stationed in Alexandria to ensure Ptolemy XII's authority on the throne.

Rome in exchange is able to exert its power over the restored king.

His daughter Cleopatra VII becomes his coregent.

Pompey and Crassus are elected as consuls for 55 BCE against a background of bribery, civil unrest and electioneering violence.

Construction begins in the same year on Rome’s first permanent theater, financed by Pompey to gain political popularity during his second consulship.

The inspiration for the theater had been Pompey's visit in 62 BCE to a Greek theater in Mytilene, on Lesbos.

Cicero, humiliated at Luca, has turned to writing philosophical and rhetorical treatises, beginning with De Oratore, a dialogue set in 91 BCE, when Lucius Licinius Crassus dies, just before the social war and the civil war between Marius and Sulla, during which Marcus Antonius Orator, the other great orator of this dialogue, dies.

Written to to describe the ideal orator and imagine him as a moral guide of the state, De Oratore is intended not merely as a treatise on rhetoric, but goes beyond mere technique to make several references to philosophical principles.

Cicero understands that the power of persuasion—the ability to verbally manipulate opinion in crucial political decisions—is a key issue.

The power of words in the hands of a man without scruples or principles will endanger the whole community.