In February 1995, Ramzi Yousef, the alleged …
Years: 1995 - 1995
In February 1995, Ramzi Yousef, the alleged mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, is captured in Pakistan and extradited to the United States.
Investigators find evidence in a search of his former residences that apparently indicate his financial ties to bin Laden.
In addition, he had reportedly stayed at a bin Laden-financed guesthouse while in Pakistan.
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…and Vietnam.
(Source: Opium: A History)
By 1995, the Golden Triangle region of Southeast Asia is the leader in opium production, yielding 2,500 tons annually.
According to U.S. drug experts, there are new drug trafficking routes from Burma …
…through Laos, …
… to southern China, …
…Cambodia …
Bin Laden, in an open letter apparently written by him to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia in August 1995, calls for a campaign of guerrilla attacks in order to drive US forces from the kingdom.
Five Americans and two Indians die in the truck bombing of a US-operated Saudi National Guard training center in Riyadh on November 13, 1995.
Bin Laden reportedly denies involvement but praises the attack. (Source: Washington Post 8.23.98).
Following their capture of Herat, the Taliban continue to receive support from Pakistan, which considers the Rabbani government as hostile and beholden to both Russia and India, from whom it had received equipment.
The CIA, which has long maintained contacts with Pakistan's Intelligence services, had recently been tasked by the US Congress to spend $20 million to destabilized the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Iran, which regards the control of Herat by the Taliban as an unacceptable affront to its national interest, had effectively terminated aid to Afghan factions, but now dramatically increases its aid to Massoud and Rabbani, as it suspects the US is behind Pakistan's support for the Taliban.
This support, together with a sharp increase in Russian aid, enables the government to strengthen itself militarily and resist the Taliban's renewed war for the capital, which begins on October 10, 1995.
By January 1995, the Taliban control five of 30 provinces; by February, nine.
Rabbani sends a delegation to Qandahar.
Rabbani's Afghan government believes that the Taliban receive active support from Pakistan's ISI and by some elements of Pakistan's powerful military.
Pakistan, for its part, fears that Rabbani's exclusively non-Pashtun government will lead Afghanistan's Pashtuns to revive the demand for Pashtunistan.
Eventually, the Taliban's remarkable military successes, and economic considerations, lead to Pakistan's policy change toward its support for the Taliban.
The Taliban, either acting independently or with encouragement from Pakistan, begin to move on Kabul.
The mujahedin parties in the southern Pashtun areas disintegrate in the face of Pakistani aid to, and overwhelming public support of, the Taliban.
Most armed groups either flee or join the Taliban.
In late January 1995, the Taliban engage the rear forces of Hekmatyar's besieging army south of Kabul.
By mid-February, they occupy Hekmatyar's main base in Charasyrab, Logar province.
Hekmatyar, who has lost hundreds of men and several tanks, flees without a fight.
Ahmad Massoud, Rabbani's Defense Minister, moves his front lines into Hekmatyar's deserted positions, then moves back slightly after negotiating an agreement with the Taliban.
Massoud now controls all of Kabul save for a Shi'a neighborhood dominated by Hizb-I Whadat.
Taliban's ulema leadership, insisting that they alone will effect disarmament and oversee security in Kabul, refuses to cooperate with any of the existing parties, denouncing them as criminal.
Following its defeat by Taliban forces in February 1995, Hizb ceases to be a major military power.
The Taliban and Massoud crush the Iranian supported Shi'a militia in South Kabul.
Massoud, after successfully pushing the Taliban out of the Kabul area in March, secures the capital from rocket attacks for the first time in years.
Under the new apparent security of the Rabbani-Massoud government, hundreds of thousands of displaced people return to Kabul.
Due to resign the previous day, Rabbani, on February 22, announces his decision to delay his resignation until 21 March, stating he will not step down unless the Taliban are included in the interim administration.
Talks stall, however, when the Taliban set three conditions for participation: only "good Muslims" may participate in the interim administration, all 30 provinces must be represented, and Kabul must be policed by a "neutral force" under Taliban control.
The talks are unsuccessful, and a stalemate ensues between the Kabul government and the Taliban.
International efforts to reach a comprehensive peace settlement meet with little success.
The swift rise of the Taliban raises concerns of ethnic warfare or an upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism.
In the mid-1990s, the Hazaras, who constitute Afghanistan's largest Shiite community, number an estimated 1,650,000, of whom about 1,500,000 live in Afghanistan, and the remainder in Iran.
Opposition to rule by the mainly Pashtun Taliban comes initially from Afghanistan's non-Pashtun ethnic groups, notably the Uzbek and Turkmen minorities.
Resistance leader Ustad (master) Abdul Ali Mazari, one of the founders, and later Secretary General, of the Islamic Wahdat Party of Afghanistan, is regarded by some Hazara as "Baba Mazari" (father) for his efforts to unite all Hazaras.
After the Taliban abducts Mazari and companions from West Kabul, they execute him on the way to Qandahar on March 11, 1995.
